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LETTERS OF CREDIT-A COMPARISON OF ARTICLE 5
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE
WASHINGTON PRACTICE
WARREN L. SHATTUCK* AND LISLE R. GUERNSEY**
[Ed. Note: This article will be published in two segments. The segment here presented
covers UCC sections 5-102 through 5-108. The second segment will be published in the
Winter, 1963 issue of the Review, and will cover UCC sections 5-109 through 5-117.]
INTRODUCTION
The title attached to this discussion is not inadvertent. Our primary
concern is with the customs and expectations of that part of the Wash-
ington business community which deals with letters of credit, rather
than with the Washington law. The latter is for the most part unde-
terminable. Only three cases concerned with letters of credit have
reached our supreme court' and there is but limited Washington statu-
tory coverage. Although the decisions of other American jurisdictions
are not binding here, the Washington court may be expected to accept
such of the existing precedents as in its estimation reach sound results.
It is accordingly necessary to review those decisions. Under the discus-
sion heading "The Present Law-in General," we have attempted to
assemble a full and representative (rather than exhaustive) coverage
of the American decisions which provide the background for article 5.
Since the Uniform Commercial Code has been enacted in eighteen
states, it is in actuality the "present law" in those jurisdictions.2
Insofar as it can effectively operate,' trade usage is a highly signifi-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
** Partner, Howe, Davis, Riese and Jones, Seattle, Washington.
'Bank of East Asia v. Pang, 140 Wash. 603, 249 Pac. 1060 (1926) (cited below at
n.115, to be published Winter, 1963) ; National City Bank v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 121
Wash. 476, 209 Pac. 705 (1922) (cited below at n.114, to be published Winter, 1963);
Kelley v. Greenough, 9 Wash. 659, 38 Pac. 158 (1894) (cited below at n.39).
2 Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wyoming. In New York, however, §5-102 (1) was
enacted with a deviation from the text as promulgated by the sponsors of UCC. Under
this deviation, Article 5 will not apply to a credit which "is by its terms or by agree-
ment or by custom subject in whole or in part to the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Commercial Documentary Credits fixed by the Thirteenth or by any subsequent
Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce...."
3 The function of usage as an aid to interpretation is well established. See RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 245 et seg. (1932), and the discussion in Shattuck, Contracts.in
TVashington, 1937-1957: Part II, 34 WASH. L. Rsv. 345, 385 (1959). Also important is
the possibility that usage will actually add an undertaking to a contract. See RESTATE-
MENT, CoNTRAcTs § 246(b) (1932); 3 CoBIN, CONTRACTS § 556 (1950). UNIFOR
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 135 (RCW 62.01.135) makes an unconditional writ-
ten promise to accept work like an acceptance, as to one who in reliance takes the
draft for value. This proposition is not applicable to documentary credits, which are by
definition conditional. It is applicable to a clean credit payable unconditionally, i.e.
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cant factor in an area such as this, where rigid legal principles have not
crystalized and the understanding of the parties is important in deter-
mining the solution of many of the problems. Trade usage then is of
interest not only because it sets a pattern with which the practice
demanded by article 5 must be compared, but also because it is impor-
tant in an evaluation of the probable course of the Washington court in
the event of litigation.
In Washington, letters of credit are issued by banks,' and bankers
are the only practicable source of information about the customs and
expectations of banks and their customers relevant to our inquiry. We
have been much helped in our effort to ascertain this information by
Mr. C. Ron Johnsone, Vice-President, and Mr. Richard W. Soderquist,
Assistant Vice-President, Seattle-First National Bank, and Mr. Clar-
ence L. Hulford, Vice-President, National Bank of Commerce. We very
much appreciate their assistance in supplying background and technical
data.
It is the practice of Washington banks to include in their documen-
tary letter of credit forms (but not in the applications taken from cus-
tomers) I a phrase making the undertaking subject to the Uniform Cus-
toms and Practices for Commercial Documentary Credits promulgated
by the Thirteenth Congress of the International Chamber of Com-
merce.' It is therefore necessary to consider these statements of cus-
tom and practice with some care. There will be a number of
references to them. The relevant publication will be referred to as
UCP. Insofar as the Uniform Customs limit, define and condition the
issuer's undertaking to the beneficiary, there is no reason to expect that
their incorporation into the letter of credit is not accomplished by the
phrase now used.' On successful incorporation by reference they oper-
without surrender of the credit. There is not, in the Uniform Commercial Code article
dealing with negotiable instruments, a comparable provision. UNIFoRM CoMManCIAm
CODE § 3-410 (1) requires that an acceptance be written on the draft, and thus would
abolish the virtual acceptance.
4 See the discussion of § 5-102(1) below.
5 As will become evident in the discussion of § 5-114(3) (to be published Winter,
1963), some of the provisions of the Uniform Customs bear on the relations between
issuer and customer. It has been deemed expedient however, in the drafting of applica-
tion forms, to state in explicit terms propositions which might be derived from the
Uniform Cubstoms, and to expand the obligation of the customer.
6 INTERATIoNAL CHAaBER OF CommEcE BRocnmEr No. 151 (1951). It contains 49
"Articles," which are described as "provision, definitions, interpretations, etc." and
which purport to be "uniform directions applying to all commercial documentary
credits." As this paper is being prepared the International Chamber of Commerce is
considering adoption of a revision of the Uniform Customs. Document No.470/105
9.111.1962, ICC, will be referred to as Proposed Revision.
7 No case has been found in which the incorporation was put in issue. In several de-
cisions the court without discussion regarded the UCP provisions as a part of the
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ate as though set out in the letter of credit and hence become a part of
it. What their function would be as to a letter of credit which does not
incorporate them, or in a relationship such as between issuer and cus-
tomer, is debatable. That there is sufficient adherence even by banks
to the propositions set out in the Uniform Customs to establish an
operative trade usage in foreign trade is doubtful.8 In domestic trans-
actions, i.e. those in which both issuer and beneficiary are within the
United States, adherence of banks to the Uniform Customs could prob-
ably be established but the existence of the requisite adherence to or
awareness of the Customs by the non-banker party9 might be hard to
establish. The Uniform Customs do not appertain to non-documentary
credits, and no reference is made to them in the forms used by Wash-
ington banks for clean credits such as those issued for travelers.
It is our hope that this discussion will serve a dual purpose: (1) pro-
vide a basis for evaluating the desirability of Article 5 and so aid in an
over-all evaluation of the Uniform Commercial Code in this period
of pre-enactment consideration of the Code's merits, and (2) provide a
point of departure for Washington bankers and lawyers who become
concerned with letter of credit problems after enactment of the Code.
The first of these objectives seems better served if we undertake with
each section a critique of its operation in light of the existing practice.
This we have done.
Among the periodical citations are several which deal with interim
drafts of article 5. These must be read with care. The article was con-
siderably amended in the final 1958 formulation of the Code.
The enactment in Washington of article 5 is, in our opinion, highly
desirable. It will provide a much-needed legal sanction for letters of
credit and will accomplish this with little change in existing practices.
The supporting data for these conclusions will appear in the section-to-
section discussion. Cumulatively, that discussion will demonstrate a
remarkable fact. The letter of credit has gained wide use in the United
States without the support of a comprehensive and determinable legal
foundation. Continued development and, in particular, wider use in
domestic trade, require a legal environment in which interested parties
credit. For example: Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co.. Inc., 264 App. Div. 525, 35
N.Y.S.2d 829 (1942). See, however, note 63 infra.
8 See the discussion, Mfentschikoff, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 571, at 572 et seq. (1956).
9 A usage is operative only where the parties agree that it shall apply, or one of
them so intends and the other knows or should know he does, or the usage is known
to or should be known to both parties and neither expresses dissent from its application.
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 247 (1932); CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 557 (1950). A com-
parable provision is contained in UNFORX COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205.
1962]
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and their counsel can estimate with greater certainty than is now pos-
sible the legal relations produced by a letter of credit.
The existing uncertainty in American letter of credit law results from
a combination of factors. One factor is the failure of courts to achieve
consensus concerning basic theory. Another factor is the absence of
any significant volume of appellate litigation save in New York and
Massachusetts and the pertinent federal courts. A third factor is the
appearance of some conflicts in the decisions. The end result in a state
like Washington is that estimating the probable position of our court
on many of the problems which can arise is but guesswork.
There is a reason for the present confusion about letter of credit
theory. Although promises by prospective drawees, to accept drafts
drawn in connection with transactions in which the promisors were
buyers or otherwise directly concerned, were an early commercial de-
velopment, 0 the now-familiar documentary irrevocable credit issued by
a bank did not come into general use until the nineteenth century."
By that time the American law of contracts and particularly the mutual
assent and consideration 2 requirements for contract formation had
settled into a pattern with which the irrevocable letter of credit does
not fit. Fortunately, the courts which first encountered letters of credit
were not hostile. Had they been, the letter of credit would have died
aborning as did the common law trust receipt. Unfortunately, in ignor-
ing theory, the decisions have left a vacuum. Into it writers have
rushed in some number, and the volume of periodical discussion of
letter of credit theory has reached astonishing proportions." The ideas
10 Trimble, The Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 HAv. L. REv. 981
(1948) ; Hershey, Letters of Credit, 32 HAgv. L. REv. 1 (1918).
"1 Thayer, Irrevocable Credits it International Commerce: Their Legal Nature, 36
CoLum. L.R. 1031, 1032, n. 6 (1936).
12 See the discussion of § 5-105 below.
13 There is of course general agreement that the issuer's promise falls within the
broad sweep of contract law. The disagreement comes in connection with details. Is
the letter of credit a kind of guaranty, or perhaps some other variety of suretyship?
Is it a commercial specialty? Do the usual mutual assent and consideration principles
apply? To what extent is the beneficiary's reliance a legally relevant factor? Does the
doctrine of estoppel supply the answers? No attempt will be made here to pursue the
ramifications of these inquiries. The important point is the disagreement about theory
displayed in the literature. See the following: Hershey, Letters of Credit, 32 Hav.
L.REv. 1 (1918) ; Note, Commercial Letters of Credit, 21 COLUm. L.REv. 176 (1921) ;
34 HAgv. L.REv. 533 (1921) ; McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 HARv. L.REv.
539, 563 et seq. (1922) ; Mead, Documentary Letters of Credit, 22 CoLum. L.REv. 297,
300 et seq. (1922) ; McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 HAxv. L. REv. 715,
737 (1922); Comment, Letters of Credit-Negotiable Instrumnents, 36 YALE L.J. 245
(1926) ; Thayer, Irrevocable Credits in International Commerce: Their Legal Na-
ture, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 1031 (1936) ; Campbell, Guaranties and the Suretyship Phases
of Letters of Credit, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 175, 188 et seq. (1936) ; Campbell, Guaranties
and the Suretyship Phases of Letters of Credit, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 261 (1936);
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advanced in periodicals and texts are on occasion interesting but hardly
have the force of law. There is probably no category of American
common law which will accommodate the irrevocable letter of credit
without distortion, and none which will produce consistently sound
results even for the revocable credit.
Analysis of an irrevocable credit, issued by a third person on behalf
of a buyer or debtor, as a contract promise supported by the customer's
payment or promise of reimbursement to the issuer, is inadequate be-
cause it opens failure-of-consideration defenses for an issuer which are
incompatible with the understanding of the business community about
the duties of the issuer to the beneficiary. 4 So long as a theoretic
hiatus exists letters of credit are vulnerable, and the vulnerability is
especially acute in a jurisdiction which has few appellate decisions of
the type which can be argued to have impliedly recognized an irrevo-
cable credit to be a legal obligation when issued. The only cure is
legislation. A statute can declare the desired legal relationships without
concern for theory. This is a major contribution of article 5.
A revocable credit issued by a third person on behalf of a buyer or
debtor can be too facilely classified as an offer, ending all inquiry into
theory. Certainly some of the problems which arise from revocable
credits can properly be disposed of by resort to ordinary revocation-of-
offer principles. That these principles should always govern is doubtful.
The requirement of revocation-communication, for instance, may not
be compatible with commercial understanding of the revocable credit."
Application of the usual rejection propositions to a revocable credit
might well lead to undesirable results. 6 Moreover, there is just as
Trimble, The LawZ Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 HARv. L. REv. 981, 994 et
scq. (1948) ; Comment, Recent Extensions in the Use of Letters of Credit, 66 YALE
L.J. 902, 911 et seq. (1957). The texts are equally diverse. See CoRBiN, CONTRACrS §§
68,76 (1950); FINELSTEIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CommERClAL LErRs oiF CannIT 28,
et seq. 274 et seq. (1930) ; WARD AND HARFmIED, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTAxCES 33,
et seq. (4th ed. 1958); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 32 (3rd ed. 1957), §§ 1011C, 1011D,
1011E (2nd ed. 1936); WmLiSTOw, SALES §§ 469c 469e (1948). American Jurispru-
dence covers letters of credit in its Guaranty chapter and gives a definition which is not
distinguishable from that of an offer for a suretyship contract. 24 Am. Jut. Guaranty §
20 (1939). Corpus Juris demonstrates a fine impartiality, giving several contradictory
definitions of "letter of credit." 9 C.J.S. Banks & Banking § 175 (1938) ; 10 C.J.S.
Bills & Notes § 23(d) at 431 (1938) ; 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 7 at 1142 (1943). The
American Digest System has assigned Banks and Banking § 191 to most phases of
letter of credit transactions, including the issuer-customer agreement. The attorney
who happens to be working with a letter of credit issued by a finance company might
have difficulty in getting on the trail. An occasional letter of credit case is also to be
found under DEC. DIG. Sales § 191.
14 See the discussion of § 5-105 below.
Ir See the discussion of § 5-106 below, and the discussion of revocability in note 26
infra.
16 An offeree's expression of intent not to accept, whether by words or conduct, is
19621
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much value behind a revocable credit, in the form of a payment or
promise of reimbursement by the customer, as there is behind an irre-
vocable credit. Such a credit seems better analyzed as a contract, the
issuer's promise being terminable. One thing is clear. A statute is
needed to declare the desired legal relationships and put a period to
discussions like this about theory. Article 5 will also provide assurance
about the operation of a revocable credit which is not revoked, an area
in which counsel must now for the most part rely on decisions involving
irrevocable credits.
Section 5-102. Scope
(1) This Article applies
(a) to a credit issued by a bank if the credit requires a documen-
tary draft or a documentary demand for payment; and
(b) to a credit issued by a person other than a bank if the credit
requires that the draft or demand for payment be accompa-
nied by a document of title; and
(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other person if the credit is
not within subparagraphs (a) or (b) but conspicuously
states that it is a letter of credit or is conspicuously so en-
titled.
UCP-The beginning three paragraphs of UCP, entitled "General
Provisions," state propositions of broad applicability. The first para-
graph, reading: "The provisions, definitions, interpretations etc. con-
tained in the following Articles are understood as uniform directions
applying to all commercial documentary credits including authorities
to pay, accept, negotiate or purchase, unless otherwise expressly
agreed," is in essence a statement of scope. Nowhere does UCP under-
take to cover credits issued by non-banks. Some of the language, par-
ticularly in articles 4 and 5, suggest that only banks can issue credits,
so far as UCP is concerned. (The Proposed Revision, General Provi-
sions and Definitions, defines a credit as an "arrangement... whereby
a Bank....") There has never been any support, either in custom or
in law, for such a limitation. UCP appertains only to documentary
credits.
a rejection which destroys an offer. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs §§ 36, 37, 38, 39
(1932), and Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 140 N.E. 803 (1923), in
which application of this rejection principle to a credit was assumed to be necessary.
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The present law-In general: Under Anglo-American law the issu-
ance of credits is not exclusively a bank function. Banks and non-
banks are probably bound by the same substantive letter of credit
principles. That national banks have implied power to issue letters of
credit has been judicially recognized." Some state banking codes ex-
pressly authorize banks to issue credits.' Whether state banks in
other states have a like power by implication is unsettled. 9
Washington law: There is no Washington statute, so far as we have
found, which mentions letters of credit.
RCW 30.08.140 authorizes a state bank to make contracts and to
accept drafts "having not more than six months sight to run," the latter
activity being extensively regulated. It can be argued with some force
that authority to accept necessarily includes authority to contract to
accept and that the Washington statute amply supports the issuance of
credits by state banks, provided the demands of the statute as to the
details are satisfied. It can also be argued that authority to accept
drafts, to run for not more than a stated period, includes authority to
contract to pay either sight or time drafts. The state Supervisor of
Banking has not, so far as we can ascertain, questioned, or indeed had
the occasion to consider, the power of a bank to issue letters of credit.
Washington practice: We have found no evidence that credits are
17 In Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 Fed. 73 (5th Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 260 U.S. 701 (1922), the court said, without discussion, that ". . . a national
bank is bound by its letter of credit." Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 21 Wall. 294,
(1875), was cited. It is hardly authority, since the issue of bank power was raised
on appeal but not considered because it had not been raised below. The Comptroller
of the Currency has ruled that national banks have the implied power to issue credits.
He found that credits calling for acceptances of drafts were impliedly permitted by §
13 of the Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 263 (1913), 39 Stat. 754 (1916), as amended,
12 U.S.C. §§ 372, 373 (1946), and that credits calling for payment fell within general
banking operations. Par. 1170, Digest of Opinions of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (1960 Revision). This administrative ruling, and the resulting bank
examiner clearance of those phases of the letter of credit which come under their
scrutiny, has been impliedly approved by Congress in its failure to vary it by amend-
ment of the national banking legislation. Congress has also recognized the propriety
of banks engaging in this activity, by expressly providing that federal banks organized
to carry on a foreign banking business can issue letters of credit. 41 Stat. 378 (1919),
as amended, 49 Stat. 704 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 615 (1946). Writers who have addressed
themselves to the question of the implied power of national banks to issue credits have
in general found the power to exist. Trimble, The Implied Power of Nat'l Banks
to Issue Letters of Credit and Accept Bills, 58 YALE L.J. 713 (1949); Harfield,
Nat'l Ban Act and Foreign Trade Practices, 61 HAgv. L. Rxv. 782, 792 (1948). Cf.
Campbell, Guaranties and the Suretyship Phases of Letters of Credit, 85 U. PA. L.
REv. 261, 291 (1937) ; See also FINxELsTEIN, LaAL ASPECTS OF CoxMmEcl.AL LETrERS
OF CREDIT 5, n.7 (1930) ; WARD AND HARFiELD, BANK CEDITs AND ACCEPTANCES 146
et seq. (4th. ed. 1958).
Is See FiNm ESix, op. cit. supra note 17, at 6.
'0See FiNrELsTEix, op. cit. supra note 17, at 5. Campbell, supra note 17, at 291.
The corporate powers of state banks are not expanded by the Federal Reserve Act.
19621
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issued in this state by persons or institutions other than banks. The
greater part of the credits issued in Washington are issued by national
banks. We have not, however, found any evidence that state banks
seriously doubt their power to issue letters of credit.
Credits issued by Washington banks call for payment or acceptance
of drafts. There has been no recent experience with or occasion to
consider the significance of tax statutes which might dictate the use of
a simple "demand for payment" rather than a draft. t
The documentary credits issued by Washington banks are typically
labelled "Irrevocable Credit." Travelers' credits are typically labelled
"Letter of Credit." The issuance of credits wholly or partially clean,
in support of sales transactions, is so infrequent as to provide no basis
for determining the existence of a practice regarding them.2"
Critique: The subsection excludes from the coverage of article 5 a
clean credit issued by a bank if the credit is not "conspicuously so en-
titled," and a credit issued by a person other than a bank if the credit
neither demands a title document nor is labelled "letter of credit." The
reason for these distinctions is not explained in the Official Comment.
It will be observed that non-conforming undertakings will be embroiled
in the common law, including the criteria for determining whether an
undertaking is a letter of credit. Such undertakings, particularly those
of persons who do not ordinarily issue letters of credit, may well be
held to be guaranties.
Since Washington banks adequately label travelers' credits, no
change in the present practice with regard to such credits would be
required by the subsection. Whether the present documentary credit
forms meet the labelling requirement is not clear. The point may be
critical if a documentary credit is modified to delete the requirement of
documents or if a credit is partly clean and partly documentary. It
would seem desirable to obviate all risk of difficulty with these varia-
tions by printing at the top of the forms the full phrase "Letter of
20 The so-called "red-clause," a type of credit which is available in whole or in part
against drafts drawn in connection with a sales transaction, it being expected that
documents will later be forthcoming, appears not to be used in Washington at the
present time. Neither is it the practice of Washington banks to delete by subsequent
modification the requirement of documents in credits issued as documentary. Interesting
examples of clean credits are to be found in American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Banco
Nacional, 231 Ala. 614, 166 So. 8 (1936), same cases 238 Ala. 128, 189 So. 191 (1939) ;
French American Banking Corp. v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 126 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1953),
aff'd, 126 N.Y.2d 887 (1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 616, 120 N.E.2d 826 (1954). The use of a
credit partly documentary and partly clean is illustrated in Oelbermann v. National City
Bank of New York, 79 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1935), vnodified, 293 U.S. 638, (1936). The
extraordinary risks taken by the person who procures a red-clause credit are well
enough demonstrated in these decisions.
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Credit." Similarly as to any forms devised for clean credits, other than
travelers' credits.
It may well be that enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code
will stimulate wider use of letters of credit in domestic trade, and en-
courage the issuance of credits by finance companies and other business
organizations."' The draftsman of their forms will of course be careful
to meet the "conspicuously so entitled" requirement of the subsection.
The fact that letters of credit typically and traditionally call for pay-
ment or acceptance of that variety of negotiable instrument known as
a "draft" creates a risk of controversy about the legal characteristics
of a promise to pay on submission of a simple demand for payment.
On the other hand, document taxes levied on drafts may make desirable
the use of the simple demand. This subsection and § 5-103 perform a
useful service in removing a possible source of trouble.
Although there is no reason to question seriously the implied power
of a Washington state bank to issue letters of credit, it must be recog-
nized that any corporate power which rests on inference is to a degree
unsatisfactory. The enactment of article 5 would strengthen the argu-
ment that RCW 30.08.140 impliedly authorizes the issuance of credits,
by opening the additional argument that the legislature would not
regulate, with the particularity of article 5, an activity which it did not
think was within the corporate powers of state banks.
(2) Unless the engagement meets the requirements of subsection
21 That there is a tremendous potential for the letter of credit in domestic transac-
tions seems obvious. No other commercial arrangement so far devised serves as well
the needs of a seller who requires protection from credit risks. With the letter of credit
he can be sure of payment at the time and point of shipment. Collection at the point
of delivery, by use of a draft accompanied by the bill of landing, poses serious prob-
lems in the protection and disposition of the goods if the buyer refuses performance.
These problems are so serious in international trade as to have fostered general use of
the letter of credit despite uncertainties as to the resulting legal relations. Enactment of
article 5 and the resulting increase in assurance concerning the substantive law, plus
wider familiarity with it on the part of lawyers and business men, should much expand
use of letters of credit in domestic trade. This is not to suggest that there is now no
appreciable use of the device in such trade. Although exact figures are not available, the
aggregate dollar amount of domestic letters of credit must reach a very large figure. See
Mentischikoff, Letter of Credit: The Need for Uniform Legislation, 23 U. CHi. L. REv.
571, 615 et seg. (1956). The successive-security arrangements which commence with a
letter of credit and end with a trust receipt, well known in import transactions, are
equally feasible in domestic trade. The transaction litigated in Consolidated Sales Co.,
Inc. v. Bank of Hampton Road, 193 Va. 307, 68 S.E.2d 652 (1952), involved household
appliances, a type of merchandise which readily lends itself to financing by a bank or
finance company after receipt of goods by the buyer and thus facilitates a secured-
transaction package starting with a letter of credit. The transaction litigated in Drinc-
0-Matic v. Frank, 141 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1944), involved soda dispensing machines.
Machinery of all kinds would appear to be a type of merchandise well suited to succes-
sive security. For a discussion of the bank-charter problems encountered in domestic




(1), this Article does not apply to engagements to make ad-
vances or to honor drafts or demands for payment, to authorities
to pay or purchase, to guarantees or to general agreements.
UCP-As was indicated in the discussion of subsection (1), UCP
purports to deal with "documentary credits including authorities to
pay, accept, negotiate or purchase .... " The evident ambiguity in this
passage is clarified in the Proposed Revision. See the discussion of
UCC § 5-103.
The present law-In general and in Washington: There is no "law"
on the subject matter of this subsection.
Washington practice: It is not the practice in Washington to describe
as "letter of credit" a transaction which falls within the exclusions
stated in this subsection. There appears to be no commercial use in
Washington of authorities to draw or of authorities to pay.
Critique: It is the view of some that letters of credit are a variety of
suretyship, since performance by the issuer will discharge the custom-
er's duty to the beneficiary. Such a classification is not desirable. It
suggests serious charter-power problems for banks, whose power to
enter into guaranties is limited.2 Equally fatal would be the saddling
of letters of credit with the suretyship defense principles which give a
special flavor to the contracts of sureties. It seems obviously preferable
to classify the letter of credit as sui generis. Clearer recognition of this
fact should be fostered by the subsection, which makes clear the non-
application of article 5 to "guarantees" (a term which no doubt encom-
passes guaranties), and by the definition of "letter of credit" which
appears in § 5-103(1). Just what is meant by the phrases "engage-
ments to make advances" and "general agreements" is not clear.
Authorities to draw and authorities to pay do not add the credit of a
third person to the basic buyer-seller or debtor-creditor relationship.
22 Merchant's Bank v. Baird, 160 Fed. 642 (8th Cir. 1908) (national bank guar-
anty held ultra vires). See also Dunn v. McCoy, 113 F.2d 587 (3rd Cir. 1940) ; Pan-
American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1925), cert.
denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925), particularly the dissent; O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co.,
159 Misc. 920, 289 N.Y. Supp. 252 (1936), aff'd, 253 App.Div. 714, 1 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1937), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 649, 16 N.E.2d 302 (1938) ; Trust Co. v. Jefferson Trust Co.,
14 N.J. Misc. 656, 186 At]. 732 (1936) ; Commercial Trust Co. v. American Trust Co.,
256 Mass. 58, 152 N.E. 104 (1926) ; Nowell v. Equitable Trust Co., 249 Mass. 585,
144 N.E. 749 (1924). These decisions differ in approach and result, indicating the
inherent difficulty in determining whether a particular transaction is at that time and
place ultra vires the particular bank concerned.
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Although in some discussions of letters of credit these authorities are
lumped with transactions in which a bank or other third person does
lend its credit,23 there is in modem practice a dear-cut line of demarca-
tion between the two types of transaction.24 The regulatory system of
article 5 is not appropriate to authorities to draw or to pay and their
exclusion in this subsection is quite in order. That they are excluded is
made clear by the definition of a credit which appears in § 5-103.
(3) This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts
of letters of credits as such rules or concepts have developed
prior to this act or may hereafter develop. The fact that this
Article states a rule does not by itself require, imply or negate
application of the same or a converse rule to a situation not pro-
vided for or to a person not specified by this Article.
UCP-Although UCP does not expressly so indicate, the proposi-
tions therein stated do not purport to cover the whole range of letter of
credit problems.
The present law-In general and in Washington: There is no "law"
on the subject matter of this subsection.
Washington practice: There is no practice relevant to this subsection.
Critique: The Official Comment says of this subsection:
no statute can effectively or wisely codify all the possible law of
letters of credit without stultifying further development of this
useful financing device. The more important area not covered by
this Article revolves around the question of when documents in
fact and in law do not comply with the terms of the credit.2" In
addition such minor matters as the absence of expiration dates
and the effect of extending shipment but not expiration dates are
also left untouched for future adjudication. The rules embodied
in the Article can be viewed as those expressing the fundamental
theory underlying letters of credit....
Another detail not covered by article 5 is the revocability of a credit
which does not expressly indicate whether it is revocable or irrevo-
23 See the discussion in McCurdy, CoMmuncrm. LErrFns OF CREDIT, 35 Hasv. L. REa.
539, 549 et seq. (1922); WARD AND HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND BANKING 11-13
(4th ed. 1958).
24 Although the oldest type of transaction to which the name "letter of credit"
has been given involved only an understanding by the prospective debtor to pay or
accept drafts drawn on him, it has been suggested that the term should now be
reserved for credits issued by a third person. FINKEa sTN, op. cit. rzpra note 17, at 18.
25 See the discussion of § 5-114(1) below (to be published Winter, 1963).
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cable.26 Still another area ignored in article 5 is the sales contract and
the operation of its provision for a credit.2"
26 It is the practice of Washington banks to clearly label documentary credits as
revocable or irrevocable. The incidence of the former is very small. Foreign and
domestic credits do not differ in this particular. Clean credits such as travelers credits
are typically not so labelled. What the position of the Washington court would be were
the issue of revocability to reach it under a credit, silent regarding revocation, cannot
be determined. UCP provides in article 3: "All credits, unless clearly stipulated as
irrevocable, are considered revocable even though an expiry date is specified." (The
Proposed Revision omits this provision and reads: "Credits may be either (a) revocable,
or (b) irrevocable. All credits, therefore, must clearly indicate whether they are re-
vocable or irrevocable.") UCP is routinely incorporated in Washington bank-issued
documentary credits by express reference. On this detail the incorporation is not
meaningful. UCP relates only to documentary credits. Such credits, where issued by
a Washington bank, expressly cover the matter of revocation. There appears to be no
definitive American case authority on this problem. Opinions such as that in Ernesto
Foglino & Co., Inc. v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 216 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1926), in which
a credit is characterized without discussion as "irrevocable" are neither authoritative
nor helpful. Opinions such as that in Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139,
140 N.E. 803 (1923), in which a letter of credit was, without careful scrutiny of the
analytic problems, characterized as an "offer," can lead to the erroneous conclusion
that it must be revocable. An offer for which a price has been paid is not revocable
and if the credit be an offer it will often have been "purchased" by means of a promise
or cash. It may seriously be doubted whether the offer idea, which had its inception
during a period when credits were promises by a prospective buyer or borrower to pay
or accept a draft drawn on him (see note 23 supra), has any relevancy now with
regard to a credit issued by a bank or other third party. Such credits are promises
made for a price (see the Introduction, note 15 supra and the discussion of § 5-114(2)
below, to be published Winter 1963) and would appear to be obligatory when made,
not mere offers looking to future obligation. Under this analysis, revocability is a
simple interpretation problem. The preferable approach is that taken in First Wis-
consin Nat'l Bank v. Forsyth Leather Co., 189 Wis. 9, 206 N.W. 843 (1926), noted
MINN. L. Rav. 612 (1926), in which the issue of revocability was resolved by ascer-
taining the intent of the parties as disclosed by the usual canons of interpretation. (It
should however be noticed that the cases cited after the statement: "Where letters are
so issued without express designation, there is authority to the effect that they are
revocable," and those cited for the contrary proposition, do not support the proposi-
tions attributed to them by the court.) See also Federal Coal Co. v. Royal Bank of
Canada, 10 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1926), in which the court held that a credit expressly
stating it was revocable would not, because it also stated a duration, support interpre-
tation as irrevocable. A credit silent regarding revocability may be deemed unclear.
If so, to it there may be applied one of two quite different approaches. The doubt may
be resolved against the issuer, using a well-known interpretation standard (see RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 236(d) (1932)). The doubt may be resolved by resort to
trade usage, which supplies the missing term (see RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs §
246(b)). Whether a relevant trade usage has developed even among American banks
is not clear. It is unclear whether such a usage, if it does exist among banks, will
appertain to a particular beneficiary. The usage-effect of UCP article 3 is also unclear
(see discussion notes 8 and 9 supra). On the other hand, it can be argued with some
force that the credit is not ambiguous. An issuer which promises to honor drafts has
arguably made a contract promise and a contract promise cannot be terminated by an
obligor who failed to expressly reserve the power to do so. Under this approach,
revocation becomes an attempt to assert an express condition, i.e. non-termination.
Courts are in general reluctant to find express conditions by inference. It follows
that such a credit is probably irrevocable.
Another argumentative factor of uncertain weight is the declaration in § 2-325(3)
of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, that a sales contract clause calling for a credit
requires an irrevocable credit save where the contrary is agreed. In ordinary course
a seller will expect and get the buyer's promise to establish an irrevocable credit. This
cannot directly affect the issuer's duty to the beneficiary, but it may well shed some
light on the issuer's intent and the reasonableness of the beneficiary's interpretation
where the credit is silent regarding revocation.
27 One recurring problem is conformity of the credit actually established, to the
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Section 5-103-Definitions
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Credit" or 'letter of credit" means an engagement by a
bank or other person made at the request of a customer and
of a kind within the scope of this Article (Section 5-102)
that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for pay-
ment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the
credit. A credit may be either revocable or irrevocable. The
engagement may be either an agreement to honor or a state-
ment that the bank or other person is authorized to honor.
(b) A "documentary draft" or a "documentary demand for pay-
ment" is one honor of which is conditioned upon the pre-
sentation of a document or documents. "Document" means
any paper including document of title, security, invoice, cer-
tificate, notice of default and the like.
(c) An "issuer" is a bank or other person issuing a credit.
(d) A "beneficiary" of a credit is a person who is entitled under
its terms to draw or demand payment.
(e) An "advising bank" is a bank which gives notification of the
issuance of a credit by another bank.
demands of a sale contract. Another is the liability of the buyer who established a
conforming credit which has been defaulted by the issuer. On the latter point there
is considerable case authority. Whether the buyer by establishing the credit discharges
his duty to pay is to be determined by interpretation of the sales contract. Where it is
silent on the point most of the cases have held that the buyer remains liable and can
be held by the seller if the issuer fails to perform the credit. Greenough v. Munroe,
53 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 672 (1931) (and the cases discussed
in the opinion) ; Bank of United States v. Seltzer, 251 N.Y. Supp. 637 (1931), noted
COLUm. L. REv. 1358 (1931); In re Canal Bank & Trust Co.'s Liquidation, 178 La.
575, 152 So. 297 (1933). See also Note, Recourse against the buyer in a letter of
credit transaction. 40 HARv. L. REv. 294 (1926). In Dickerman v. Ohashi Importing
Co., 62 Cal. App. 101, 218 Pac. 458 (1923), a buyer unsuccessfully argued that his
duty to pay was by reason of trade usage impliedly conditioned on presentment of a
draft by the seller within the period stipulated in the letter of credit; payment was
refused by the issuer because the draft was presented after expiry of the credit.
Interpretation can lead to a different result, as is indicated by Ornstein v. Hickerson,
40 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. La. 1941), where a contract provision calling for "payment" by
acceptance of a time draft under a letter of credit was held to mean the buyer was
discharged when such acceptance took place; the issuer failed after acceptance and
the draft was not paid at maturity. This is certainly a detail which should be spe-
cifically and fully covered in the sales contract. The risk of controversy about it is
acute if the issuer becomes insolvent after the credit is established. Other aspects of
the matter do not so readily lend themselves to drafting. Having tendered to the bank,
must the seller recover his documents and tender them to the buyer in order to mature
a cause of action against him, and what of the time factor? Ordinarily performance
by the seller will be a constructive condition to the buyer's duty to pay, and delay past
performance date may well be fatal to an effective tender of performance.
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(f) A "confirming bank" is a bank which engages either that it
will itself honor a credit already issued by another bank or
that such a credit will be honored by the issuer or a third
bank.
(g) A "customer" is a buyer or other person who causes an
issuer to issue a credit. The term also includes a bank which
procures issuance or confirmation on behalf of that bank's
customer.
(2) Other definitions applying to this Article and the sections in
which they appear are:
"Notation of Credit". Section 5-108.
'Tresenter". Section 5-112(3).
(3) Definitions in other Articles applying to this Article and the
sections in which they appear are:
"Accept" or "Acceptance". Section 3-410.
"Contract for sale". Section 2-106.
"Draft". Section 3-104.
"Holder in due course". Section 3-302.
'Midnight deadline". Section 4-104.
"Security". Section 8-102.
(4) In addition, Article 1 contains general definitions and prin.
ciples of construction and interpretation applicable through-
out this Article.
UCP-Article 5 of UCP reads in part : "Irrevocable credits are
definite undertakings by an issuing Bank and constitute the engage-
ment of that Bank to the beneficiary or as the case may be, to the
beneficiary and bona fide holders of drafts drawn thereunder that the
provisions for payment, acceptance or negotiation contained in the
credit, will be duly fulfilled ... ." This article goes on to say that
confirmation of an irrevocable credit "implies a definite undertaking
of the confirming Bank as from the date on which it gives confirma-
tion," and that confirmation of a credit available by negotiation of
drafts "implies only the undertaking of the confirming bank to nego-
tiate drafts without recourse to drawer." Article 6 reads: "Irrevo-
cable credits may be advised to the beneficiary through an advising
Bank without responsibility on the latter's part." The Proposed
Revision, General Provisions and Definitions, adds a definition of
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"credit," in language comparable to that of the Uniform Commercial
Code, and goes on to include an arrangement which "authorizes such
payments to be made, or such drafts to be made, accepted or negotiated
by another Bank ... .". General Provisions and Definitions.
The present law-In general: There are opinions in which a
promise by a prospective buyer or debtor to honor drafts drawn on
him is denominated "letter of credit."28 The decisions acknowledge the
classification of credits as irrevocable or revocable.29 No particular
form of language for a letter of credit is demanded by American cases.3"
There is no consensus in the use of descriptive terms for the process by
which the obligation is undertaken and for the parties to a letter of
credit transaction. "Seller" and "Buyer" are often used to indicate
the person who procures a credit and the obligee of it, while the obligor
is often referred to only as "the bank." Various special terms (which
are mentioned in Critique below) appear in opinions.
Washington Law: The Washington court has referred to the person
who procurred a credit as the "customer" and has used the phrase "the
letter of credit was issued."'"
Washington practice: Washington banks regard as a letter of credit
only an undertaking by one other than a prospective buyer or debtor,
acknowledge that credits can be revocable or irrevocable, and use
indifferently in their documents the terms "we agree to honor," "we
engage that drafts will be honored" and "we authorize you to draw on
us." Washington banks also use the terms "issuer," "beneficiary,"
confirming bank" and "advising bank" in ways not inconsistent with §
5-103. The term "customer" has not been used to describe a bank
which at the request of its customer asks another bank to issue a letter
of credit. No particular term has been used to describe the requesting
bank. The person who purchases a credit is now often referred to as
the "account party."
Critique: The terminology of UCP as indicated in the parts quoted
above is in general that of Washington banks. Section 5-103 does not
conflict with this usage. The section states a precise word-usage which
is a welcome relief from the variations in terminology encountered in
opinions. There is no reason to think the definitions set out here point
to legal results at variance with those otherwise expectable in Washing-
28 See discussion note 10 supra.
29 See discussion note 26 stpra.
30 See the discussion of § 5-104 below.
31 National City Bank v. Seattle Nat!1 Banl, 121 Wash. 476, 209 Pac. 705 (1922).
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ton. The section does not use, and hence should foster the obsolescence
of various terms which on occasion have been used to designate refine-
ments in letter of credit transactions."2
Extension of the term "customer" to include a bank which requests
another bank to issue a credit seems entirely sound. It is presently
expected that the requesting bank will reimburse the issuing bank and
otherwise have the burdens which characterize a "customer."3 It may
as well be so denominated.
The term "document" as used in this section differs from the usage
of that word in article 9, where it means "document of title."3 The
broader use in article 5 is clearly set out here and conforms to the
present letter of credit usage. It has long been recognized that a
documentary credit can and typically will require not only a document
of title but related papers such as an inspection certificate and an
insurance policy.
Section 5-104. Formal Requirements; Signing
Except as otherwise required in subsection (1) (c) of Section 5-102
on scope, no particular form of phrasing is required for a credit.
A credit must be in writing and signed by the issuer and a confir-
mation must be in writing and signed by the confirming bank. A
modification of the terms of a credit or confirmation must be
signed by the issuer or confirming bank.
UCP-The UCP is silent regarding form and the need for a writing.
The Proposed Revision defines a credit as "any arrangement, however
named or described... " (General Provisions and Definitions), and,
in article 3, requires a confirmation to be in writing.
The present law-In General: American courts have refused to
create standards which would force a letter of credit into a particular
phrasing." The cases divide on the applicability of the Statute of
3 2Examples are: "negotiation credit." "straight credit," "acceptance credit," "cash
credit," "circular credit," "open credit," "anticipatory credit," "revolving credit," "pre-
sentation credit," "special credit" and "sight credit."
33 Whether these expectations conform to the legal situation is another matter. See
the discussion of § 5-114(3) below (to be published Winter, 1963).
34 §§ 1-201(15) ; 9-105 (e).
35 Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 Fed. 73 (5th Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 260 U.S. 701 (1922) ("We guarantee irrevocably payment for account Joseph
De Bona covering purchase 200 long tons . . ." was held to create a letter of credit
and not a guaranty); Second Nat'l Bank of Toledo v. M. Samuel & Sons, 12 F.2d
963 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 720 (1926) ("You are hereby authorized to
draw on Irving National Bank.... We hereby agree with the drawers, indorsers,
and bona fide holders of the drafts . .. that the same will be duly honored ....") ;
Drink-O-Matic, Inc. v. Frank, 141 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1944) (letter from bank to its
customer expressing willingness to pay a draft drawn on the bank by a seller from
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Frauds." There appears to be no definitive authority regarding modi-
fications. The Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law does not re-
quire that an extrinsic or virtual acceptance be written on the draft but
does demand that the collateral undertaking of the drawee be in writ-
ing." Although an expression in a credit of an unconditional purpose
to accept will fall within this statute,"8 a documentary credit is by
definition conditional.
Washington law: The Washington court has enforced an oral
promise by A to B, to honor drafts drawn on A by C if B purchased
whom the customer was purchasing goods, held to be a letter of credit); Citizens
Nat'l Trust & Savings Bank v. Londono, 204 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 866 (1953) ("We hereby authorize you to value on us ... ." said to be a
letter of credit) ; Liberty Nat'l B. & T. Co. v. Bank of American Nat'l T. & S. Ass'n,
218 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955) (the dispute grew out of a sale and re-sale; Liberty for
the second buyer issued a credit requiring the presentation of documents; Bank of
America was the beneficiary of Liberty's credit and the issuer of a credit requiring the
presentation of documents, on behalf of the first buyer; of this credit a Swiss bank
was the beneficiciary; due to demands of the original seller, Liberty was induced to wire
Bank of America authorizing, to quote the court "payment in Geneva on receipt of
cable advice from Bank of Switzerland that it held the documents .... "; Bank of
America paid under its credit on receipt of such a cable; in this action against Liberty,
Bank of America recovered; the court apparently treated Liberty's wire as a credit
and Bank of America as the beneficiary of it) ; Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246
Mass. 139, 140 N.E. 803 (1923) ("Advise Moss & Co. we open irrevocable credit ...
in their favor ... " constituted a credit) ; John McClure Estate, Inc. v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 243 Mass 408, 137 N.E. 701 (1923) (bank "notified" seller that it "would
honor such draft for $4,783.73"; this communication was held to create legal liability
in the bank to honor the mentioned draft; the bank's message evidently operated as a
letter of credit although the court did not so denominate it) ; Lamborn v. National
Park Bank, 240 N.Y. 520, 148 N.E. 664 (1925) (letter reading: 'We beg to advise
you that we have received instructions ... to open a confirmed credit in your favor
with Bankers' Trust Co .... We advised the Bankers' Trust Company of this
credit ... but they have returned our advices, stating that credit should have been
directly with you. ... Kindly advise us in this connection," was held to create a
letter of credit) ; First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Forsyth Leather Co., 189 Wis. 9,
206 N.W. 843 (1926) ("We hereby authorize you to value on (us)" was not ques-
tioned as letter of credit language; the dispute was about revocability) ; Consolidated
Sales Co. v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Vo. 307, 68 S.E. 2d 652 (1952) ("If you
will draft on the Holland Radio Company at this bank... drafts will be honored...."
was held to constitute a credit) ; Bridge v. Welda State Bank, 222 Mo. App. 586, 292
S.W. 1079 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927) ("The four Brecheisen brothers ... are all shipping
hay to you. Please honor any sight drafts they should draw on you. Should any of
them overdraw, please draw sight draft back of them... and our bank will guarantee
that the draft will be promptly paid," held to be a letter of credit). See also Annot.,
What constitutes letter of credit, 30 A.L.R. 1310, 1312 et. seq. (1924), and Second
Nat'l Bank of Hoboken v. Columbia Trust Co., 288 Fed. 17 (1923). Granted that
an issuer's undertaking can be in any language which expresses a promise to pay, no
credit can exist where the alleged issuer made no promise. Bril v. Suomen Pankld
Finlands Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 97 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
36 See the discussion, FiNxLsmNr, op. cit. supra note 17, at 33. See also id. at 118
as to oral actual or virtual acceptances and the impact on them of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law.
37 Sections 132, 134, 135. See Baxrrox, BILLS AND NotEs § 172 et seq. (2d ed.
1961) ; Finkelstein, Acceptances and Promnses to Accept, 26 CoLum. L. Rxv. 684
(1926).38 FINESTEIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 117; See also Annot., Rights and remedies
of holder of draft issued lnder letter of credit which is dishonwred, 53 A.L.R. 57, 60
(1928) for citations of pre-Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law decisions.
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such drafts. 9 An undertaking of this kind is the same as the promise
of an issuer to a person who negotiates drafts drawn by the beneficiary,
and is not distinguishable from a promise by A to B to honor drafts
drawn on A by B, which is the stereotype of the modern commercial
credit.
Washington practice: The language used by Washington banks in
their letter of credit forms" amply demonstrates their assumption that
a credit need not be couched in any particular words. There is appar-
entiy no commercial use of oral credits, modifications, or confirmations
in Washington, and no likelihood that change in this pattern will
occur in the future. There being no relevant practice, there is no basis
for estimating the expectations of banks and their customers about
oral credits, modifications or confirmations.
Critique: The first sentence of the subsection conforms to the
present practice. Enactment of article 5 will not inhibit the develop-
ment of variant phraseology if commercial expediency makes it
desirable.
In requiring that a documentary credit, modification or confirmation
be in writing and signed by the issuer the subsection exacts a formality
not now necessary. Even in jurisdictions which apply to a credit the
Statute of Frauds section relating to sureties the credit need not be
written. A memorandum will suffice. The change would bring the law
into harmony with long standing business practice. Documentary
credits are demanded, purchased and issued by persons and institutions
who understand the hazards of excessive informality in contractual
relations and expect credits, modifications and confirmations to be
written and signed. In requiring that a non-documentary credit,
modification, or confirmation be in writing and signed by the issuer
the subsection conforms both to the existing law and to the present
practice. It will be noted that the subsection does not purport to say
what the legal situation will be if what is otherwise a credit is expressed
verbally. Courts will be free to attribute to such undertakings what-
ever legal attributes they deem properly derivable from the general
law of contracts.
39 Kelley v. Greenough, 9 Wash. 659, 38 Pac. 158 (1894). Cf. Seattle Shoe Co. v.
Packard, 43 Wash. 527, 86 Pac. 845 (1906), in which § 132 of the UNrFoRM NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (which requires an acceptance to be in writing) was in-
voked to defeat an attempt to establish a virtual acceptance by evidence showing that
the drawee had honored previous similar drafts.
40 For example, "We engage that drafts . will meet with due honor"; "We
hereby authorize you to value on us"; "We engage with you that drafts ... will be
duly honored"; "We hereby agree . . . that drafts shall be honored."
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Enactment of the subsection will not necessitate any change in the
forms now preferred by Washington banks. On the other hand, the
subsection does not preclude the use of an ordinary business letter as a
vehicle for expressing a credit, a modification of a credit, or a confir-
mation.
Since § 3-410 requires an acceptance to be written on the draft,
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code will clarify the position
of persons who hold drafts issued pursuant to a credit. The present
confusion as to whether such a person should sue on the draft or on
the credit will be resolved. He can only sue on the credit.
(2) A telegram may be a sufficiently signed writing if it identifies its
sender by an authorized authentication. The authentication
may be in code and the authorized naming of the issuer in an
advice of credit is a sufficient signing.
UCP-Article 12, (article 10, Proposed Revision) reads in part:
"Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the consequences
arising out of ... errors ... in the transmission of cables, telegrams,
or other mechanically transmitted messages. .. ." This indicates an
expectation that credits will be communicated by telegraph but is
otherwise not relevant concerning the problem to which the subsection
is addressed.
The present law-In General: There appears to be no reason to
doubt the sufficiency of a telegram as a memorandum, in jurisdictions
which now apply the Statute of Frauds to letters of credit."
Washington law: There appears to be no relevant decision in
Washington.
Washington practice: The telegraph is customarily used in letter of
credit transactions and Washington banks do not question the legal
efficacy of such messages.
Critique: The subsection is made necessary by the requirement
that a credit be in writing and signed. Use of the telegraph is often
important in issuing, modifying or confirming a credit and it is desirable
to leave no open question concerning the adequacy of a telegram
either as to its being a "writing" or as to its being "signed." The
provision for authentication by a code symbol recognizes the general
use of such symbols in the transmission of cablegrams. The subsection




conforms to the present practice and will require no change in forms
or procedures.
Section 5-105. Consideration
No consideration is necessary to establish a credit or to enlarge
or otherwise modify its terms.
UCP-There is no proposition about consideration to be found in
UCP. The omission is not surprising. Consideration is a common law
notion and unknown to the civil law. UCP does, in article 5 (article 3,
Proposed Revision), define irrevocable credits as "definite under-
takings by an issuing Bank and constitute the engagement of that
Bank to the beneficiary ... that the provisions for payment, accep-
tance or negotiation contained in the credit will be duly fulfilled pro-
vided that the documents.., comply with the terms and conditions of
the credit." Under this provision the credit is a legal obligation when
issued, and one which can be defeated only by showing non-compliance
with "terms and conditions." The common-law concepts of mutual
assent, consideration and failure of consideration are not compatible
with an obligation of this kind.
The present law-In general: There appear to be but a few cases
in which consideration for an issuer's promise was directly in issue.
The decisions demonstrate no general inclination to abandon consid-
eration as a criterion for the issuer's legal liability.2 Failure of con-
sideration cases are too infrequent to be meaningful."
42 Carnegie v. Morrison, 43 Mass (2 Met.) 381 (1841) is a good example. So are
Townsley v. Sumrall, 27 U.S. 170 (1829) (X promised Y to accept a draft drawn on
X by W; Y knew W did not then have any funds with X and that X expected to
receive such funds before maturity of the draft; W became insolvent and X refused
to accept; held that consideration was provided in Y's acquisition of the drafts for a
price) ; Ouachita Valley Bank v. De Motte, 173 Ark. 53, 291 S.W. 984 (1927) (bene-
ficiary's act of "shipping and delivering" the subject matter of its contract with the
customer was consideration for issuer's promise) ; Evansville Nat'l Bank v. Kaufman,
93 N.Y. 273 (1883) (a letter phrased "Any drafts that you may draw on Mr. A.
Feigelstock, of our city, we guarantee to be paid at maturity."; court referred to this
as a "letter of credit" and regulated by "guaranty" principles including a requirement
of consideration which the court found was not satisfied). See also Russell Grader
Mfg. Co. v. Farmers' Exch. State Bank, 49 N.D. 999, 194 N.W. 387 (1923) (the
court inferred that absence of consideration would be a defense, had such been proved).
Contra, Bridge v. Welda State Bank, 222 Mo. App. 586, 292 S.W. 1079 (1927) (The
court said: "The fact that defendant (issuer) derived no benefit from its promise
constitutes no defense to liability on a letter of credit," 292 S.W. at 1083; this proposi-
tion was not elaborated). In Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y.
386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925), it was held that an alleged modification of a credit failed
for lack of consideration.
An interesting variation is provided by Johannessen v. Munroe, 158 N.Y. 641, 53
N.E. 535 (1899), in which the court held an issuer estopped from attacking the credit
"for any cause." The asserted defense was diversion of the credit from the con-
templated use. The court's approach has obvious promissory estoppel implications.
43 Oil Well Supply Co. v. MacMurphy, 119 Minn. 500, 138 N.W. 784 (1912) (issuer
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Washington law: There appears to be no relevant Washington
decision.
Washington practice: Washington banks expect an issuer who
undertakes an irrevocable credit to perform quite without regard to
any technical details such as consideration and failure of consideration.
Customers who procure and beneficiaries who demand credits enter-
tain a like understanding. Washington banks do not regard revocable
credits as legally obligatory, no matter what the customer may have
paid or promised to pay for such a credit.
Critique: The infrequency with which issuers have invoked absence
or failure of consideration principles in an effort to escape liability
reflects much credit on the banking industry. It has, however, stulti-
fied the development of the appellate litigation which would clearly
delineate judicial attitudes toward the irrevocable credit. Although
there is not, so far as decided cases go, any reason to expect American
courts in general to open consideration defenses for issuers, there is
ample reason for uneasiness. There is an obvious gap between basic
contract law and the irrevocable credit as understood by the business
community. It is a gap which can be bridged satisfactorily only by
legislation. Section 5-105 supplies the needed corrective.
defended on the ground that the customer was expected to put up collateral and had
not done so; the court said: "We fail to see how the proffered proof could affect the
plaintiff, which bought the draft on the strength of the telegrams," but did not discuss
the technical failure of consideration problem) ; American Steel Co. v. Irving Nat'l
Bank 266 Fed. 41 (2d Cir. 1920) (issuer tried to defend on the ground that the
customer's plan to export the goods had become impossible of execution because of a
change in government regulations. Presumably this affected the customer's ability to
secure the bank, although the detail is not examined in the opinion. In denying the
defense the court said: "The law is that a bank issuing a letter of credit ...cannotjustify its refusal to honor its obligations by reason of the contract relations between
the bank and its depositor."); Palmer v. Rice, 36 Neb. 844, 55 N.W. 256 (1893)(issuer refused payment because customer's account showed a debit balance; court
viewed this as an attempt to fasten a new condition on the credit and held for the
beneficiary without discussing consideration or failure of consideration). These de-
cisions demonstrate an inclination to hold the issuer despite the development of facts
which might support a failure of consideration defense. They can hardly be deemed
direct holdings on such a defense. A flat statement such as appears in FINIKELSTEIN,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 251, "It has therefore been held that the bank cannot refuse
to pay its drafts to the seller on the ground that the ... consideration from the buyer
has failed.... ." must be taken with much caution.
Still another analytic difficulty is illustrated by Russell v. Timothy Wiggin, 2 Story
213 (C.C. Mass. 1842). The court was invited to deny recovery by a beneficiary on
the ground that he was not in privity with the issuer. The invitation was declined.
The court held the beneficiary became a party and provided the consideration when
it extended credit to the customer. It is apparent that this approach kills any concern
for the issuer's reimbursement interest. In the Russell case the court informs us that
the customer became insolvent and breached his promise to put the issuer in funds,
but as an explanation for the issuer's refusal to honor drafts and not as a basis for a
failure consideration discussion. If it be recognized that the issuer's consideration
must be found in an act or promise of the customer, cases like this shed no light on
the expectable results where the customer breaches his promise to the issuer.
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For several hundred years the common law has been developing
contract doctrine around the concept of bargain (with reliance as an
alternative reason for enforcing a promise). The bargain idea postu-
lates an exchange and hence consideration, which is something
demanded and obtained by a promisor as the price for his promise.
Equally vital is the concept of failure of consideration. Where the
exchange received by a promisor is a counter-promise, subsequent
events which make performance of the counter-promise impossible or
unlikely should justify the promisor's refusal to render his perfor-
mance. These propositions cannot be harmonized with the conception
of a credit as an obligation on which the beneficiary can implicitly
rely.
If the credit is analyzed as a simple offer to the beneficiary, it must
be revocable even though it purports in its terms to be irrevocable.44
44 In the usual offer the offeror in specifying what he wants from the offeree
(promise, act or forbearance) indicates what the off eree must do to accept and also
identifies the consideration the offeree is to provide. Despite recurring definitions of a
letter of credit as a "request" to the beneficiary to sell goods or loan money to the
customer, it is obvious that the modem documentary credit requests nothing of the
beneficiary. The forms contain no language of request addressed to the beneficiary
and none can be made out by implication. The basic contract between customer and
beneficiary will have already been entered into and the beneficiary's duty to sell or
loan will have been created by it. There are serious antecedent-duty problems if the
beneficiary's performance of that duty is asserted as consideration for the issuer's
promise. The issuer is not bargaining for an advantage to the customer. The issuer
of a credit charges a fee which is the exchange it exacts. For this reason a travelers
credit which contains (as some do) language of request, cannot properly be analysed
as bargaining for the beneficiary's putting the customer in funds. Moreover such a
credit is often addressed to banks in countries where the very idea of consideration is
unknown. On similar reasoning the issuer's promise to honor, made to bona fide
holders of drafts drawn by the beneficiary, is not a request that drafts be negotiated
as the price contemplated by the issuer for his undertaking. There may of course be
from time to time transactions in which a non-professional issuer undertakes a credit
without charging a fee, actually bargaining for the benefit to the customer which will
come from shipment of goods or other extension of credit. This possibility is not a
valid basis for questioning the wisdom of § 5-105. Consideration is not compatible
with the normal function of credits and the individual who strays into such a trans-
action cannot with propriety object to the invocation against him of the legal principles
which normally appertain.
Cases such as Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139. 140 N.E. 803 (1923),
in which a letter of credit is defined as "an offer by a bank or other financial agency
to be bound ...when accepted and acted upon. . . ", invoke not only the mutual
assent principles which the court was apparently anxious to apply but also considera-
tion principles, since the offeree's promise or act is the only rational source of con-
sideration. The whole analytic structure of these decisions seems demonstrably at
variance with the facts. Preferable in result although typically unhelpful in ex-
plaining it, are cases such as Doelger v. Battery Park Nat'l Bank, 201 App. Div. 515,
194 N.Y.S. 582 (1922) (credit said to be a contract between issuer and beneficiary,
from the time of issuance). For discussions of the impact on consideration and revo-
cation issues of the absence of consensus as to the basic theory on which letters of
credit rest, see Comment, Banks and Banking: Letters of Credit, 12 CAIF. L. REv. 500
(1924) ; WILLISToN, Co RacTrs § 1011D (rev. ed. 1936). With particular reference to
revocability, see McCurdy, The Right of the Beneficiary Under a Commercial Letter
of Credit, 37 HARv. L. R-v. 323 (1924) ; Thayer, Irrevocable Credits in International
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If the credit is analyzed as an option or as a contract promise to pay or
accept, consideration being provided by the customer's promised pay-
ment of a commission and of reimbursement, the credit is irrevocable
when issued but is vulnerable to failure of consideration defenses.
Neither analysis is compatible with the business use of an irrevocable
credit. There is no provision within the framework of contract doctrine
as it now exists for the type of legal duty which a credit must create
in order to perform its proper business function. It would perhaps be
within the power of courts to carve out an exception applicable to
credits. The possibility that in time and after much litigation American
courts might come to hold an "irrevocable" credit to be irrevocable
in fact and law is not a satisfactory foundation for credits as a com-
mercial institution. This is peculiarly a situation in which legislation
is the only satisfactory solution. A statute like § 5-105 is badly needed.
It will be observed that the section accomplishes its objective by
removing a defense which an issuer might otherwise have, a defense
which would in some transactions take all force from the affirmative
declaration of the issuer's duties which is set out in §§ 5-106, 5-114
and 5-115.
Modification of an existing irrevocable credit creates problems no
different from those present in the original credit, so far as revocability
is concerned. 5 The section is therefore properly made broad enough
to make modifications obligatory without regard to consideration.
Granted that the section is a necessary element in the future
development of letter of credit use by business men, does it put on
issuers an undesirable risk? If the customer fails, his promise to
reimburse the issuer may be worthless. There is a simple answer
to this inquiry. Banks now regard themselves as taking the risk of
inability to obtain reimbursement from the customer, and approach
the possibility as a straight bank-credit problem. If the documents
are not sufficient collateral, additional collateral or a cash payment is
demanded from the customer. It must also be recognized that the
section does not destroy a defense which issuers now certainly have.
Rather it terminates an uncertainty as to whether such a defense
Commerce: Their Legal Nature, 36 CoLumr. L. REv. 1031, 1041 (1936); Thayer,
Irrevocable Credits in International Commerce: Their Legal Effects, 37 CoLum. L.
REv. 1326, 1330 et seq. (1937).
15 Some knotty consideration problems are created by modification agreements in
Washington, which make it especially desirable to free credits from consideration




might be available. The existence of a statute fixing an issuer's liability
under an irrevocable credit will be beneficial for still another reason.
It will strengthen the position of an issuer which is faced with a demand
from the customer that the credit be revoked. Such a demand, if
accompanied by a threat of refusal to reimburse, produces a very
complicated problem. It is a repudiation by the customer which is in
turn prospective failure of consideration where the consideration for
the bank's promise is the customer's promise and this is arguably a
defense to the issuer justifying his non-performance to the beneficiary.
If the issuer performs anyway, its right to reimbursement is arguably
prejudiced. Although there is apparently no case authority indicating
that this argumentative chain will be persuasive to judges, the section
does some good in enabling the issuer to stand flatly on a statute
declaring his legal duty to the beneficiary to be irrevocable no matter
what the customer theatens or demands.
Revocable credits present a quite different analytic problem. By
definition such credits can be avoided by the issuer. On the other
hand, in modern practice revocable credits may be issued by third
persons to back up a transaction between customer and beneficiary,
just as are documentary credits, and the customer will have paid for
the service. Application of normal consideration principles to a revo-
cable credit is unsatisfactory. The issuer's complete control over its
performance makes its promise illusory. The customer's promise to
the issuer is arguably unenforceable because the issuer's promise is
illusory, hence is not consideration. The issuer cannot on this reason-
ing receive consideration in the customer's promise. If it is attempted
to analyse the credit as an offer, intending to locate consideration in the
beneficiary's acts, the attempt must arguably fail because the issuer
has really made no promise. Revocable credits need a statutory base
and freedom from the uncertainties which now appertain.
Sections 5-106. Time and Effect of Establishment of Credit
(1) Unless otherwise agreed a credit is established
(a) as regards the customer as soon as a letter of credit is
sent to him or the letter of credit or an authorized
written advice of its issuance is sent to the beneficiary;
and
(b) as regards the beneficiary when he receives a letter of
credit or an authorized written advice of its issuance.
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The word "sent" used in this subsection is defined in § 1-201(38).
A writing (which includes a telegram; see § 5-104(2)) is sent when it
is deposited in the mail or delivered to a telegraph company for trans-
mission, properly addressed and postage or transmission charges pre-
paid. A communication which does not satisfy the indicated conditions
will nevertheless be effective if received within the time which would
have been required for transmission had the conditions been met. The
word "established" used here and in § 5-105 is not defined in the
Code and is not otherwise a term of art. It evidently means "comes
into existence as a legal obligation."
UCP-The UCP has no coverage of these details.
The present law-In general and in Washington: There appears
to be no definitive case authority fixing the precise point in the trans-
action at which a credit becomes legally obligatory or indicating that
differing points might appertain as to customer and beneficiary. There
is considerable indirect and confusing information to be derived from
decisions in which other points were in issue.4" Presumably a court
which purports to find in a credit an offer to the beneficiary can be
expected to hold that a contract is created when the beneficiary accepts
the acceptance being his extension of credit to the customer. Pre-
sumably a court which regards the credit as a legal obligation created
by a combination of customer's consideration and issuer's promise
is also prepared to find mutual assent in the negotiations between these
parties. A contract will exist when the acceptance is made. In a
jurisdiction which is not committed to a particular theory of credits, no
prediction about the point at which a credit will become a legal obliga-
tion can be validly undertaken. It can safely be noted however that
none of the theories which have so far been advanced permits of the
flexibility in operation possible under § 5-106.
Washington practice: Washington banks deem themselves bound
for some purposes when the credit is put in course of transmission,
and believe they have a legal right to intercept and terminate a credit
46 See the discussion of § 5-103(1) (a). See also Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands
Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 97 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct 1950), which contains a dictum indi-
cating that a credit is a legal obligation only when "delivered" to the beneficiary; and
Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1925),
cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554, (1925), in which the problem was raised but was disposed
of by the court in these words: "We are of opinion that by express agreement it
became irrevocable as soon as... communicated... to (beneficiary)... " The
contest was between an issuer and a bank which requested issuance of the credit and
tried to get it cancelled after the beneficiary had been informed by the issuer's agent
that the credit was issued.
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by a telegram which reaches the addressee before the credit. Save
for travelers credits, delivery of a credit to the customer is so rare
that no discernible practice has developed concerning the right of an
issuer to take back a credit from a customer so long as the beneficiary
has not been informed of it.
Critique: This subsection creates a system which conforms to the
needs and expectations of the business community. The system is a
complex of three elements. First: It is recognized that the customer
buys an irrevocable credit i.e., a legal obligation of which the bene-
ficiary is the obligee, as he buys any merchandise or service. Having
bought it he should have the advantage of it at the earliest practicable
time. Part (a) fixes this time as the moment of sending, either to the
customer or to the beneficiary. In so doing it provides as much cer-
tainty on this detail as can reasonably be expected. After the credit is
sent the issuer cannot by its own motion vary or terminate the credit
as a legal obligation.
Second: It is recognized that the customer may change his mind.
After buying a credit he may find he does not want it. He should be
able to re-sell it to the issuer. This the subsection makes possible. His
right to undo the credit must however be subject to limitations which
acknowledge the beneficiary's right to rely on a credit known to him.
Hence the cut-off point indicated in part (b).
Third: It is recognized that the issuer will on occasion rely on the
customer for both reimbursement and its fee. The customer's cir-
cumstances may change for the worse. If he fails the issuer should be
able to terminate the credit provided it or advice of it has not yet
reached the beneficiary. This the subsection makes possible, provided
the customer's consent is obtained. There is no reason why the custo-
mer's consent cannot be given in his application for the credit and an
appropriate provision will no doubt be incorporated in application
forms. An obligation having the characteristics indicated above fits
no category of legal relation now known to the common law. A statute
is needed to achieve such flexibility.
The Code cannot and does not attempt to extricate issuers from the
factual uncertainties which will be encountered in the operation of
these subsections. The issuer is given a right to terminate an irrevo-
cable credit not yet delivered to or advised to the beneficiary, either
to protect the issuer's interest or that of the customer, but must accept
the uncertainty of whether the terminating communication reaches
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the beneficiary first. Issuers must and will develop techniques for
handling this problem. The financial risks involved should be borne
by the customer, whose application provides the obvious vehicle for
anticipating and allocating such risks.
The issuer will not be able to deal safely with a customer who
proposes to surrender a credit which was delivered to him and remains
in his possession. The phrase in subsection (1) (a), "or an authorized
written advice of its issuance is sent to the benefiiciary," appears to
cover a written advice sent by the customer (although an application-
form clause to this effect will be useful) and the issuer cannot be
certain that the beneficiary has not been so advised. This too presents
issuers with a problem for which appropriate operating procedures will
have to be developed.
In the final analysis, it will be seen that the Code at this juncture
represents a desirable improvement in the assurance it affords concern-
ing the legal situation. The accompanying uncertainties are of a
factual nature and will be resolvable in practice without undue
difficulty.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed once an irrevocable credit is established
as regards the customer it can be modified or revoked only with
the consent of the customer and once it is established as regards
the beneficiary it can be modified or revoked only with his
consent.
UCP-Article 5 (article 3, Proposed Revision) reads in part: "Such
undertakings can neither be modified nor cancelled without the agree-
ment of all concerned." The "undertakings" referred to are irrevocable
credits and confirmations thereof.
The present law-In general: An unjustified repudiation of a credit
is actionable by the beneficiary.47 An attempted modification by the
issuer, not consented to by the beneficiary, is inoperative. 8 There are
several decisions illustrating modifications which were evidently con-
sented to by all concerned and not contested.49 An issuer need not
47 Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 216 N.Y.S. 225 (1926),
rood. as to damages, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878 (1926). See also the discussion of§ 5-115(2) below (to be published Winter. 1963).4
8 Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922 (S.D. N.Y.
1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); Lambourn v. National Park Bank, 240
N.Y. 520, 148 N.E. 664 (1925).
49 Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., supra note 48; American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Banco Naeional, 238 Ala. 128, 189 So. 191 (1939) ; G. Jaris &
Co. v. Banque D'Athenes, 246 Mass. 546. 141 N.E. 576 (1923) ; Ernesto Foglino & Co.
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accede to a demand by the customer for modification of a credit after
the beneficiary has been notified, and cannot modify a credit by
agreement with the beneficiary alone.20 A credit is not established by
a communication from the alleged issuer to an advising bank, of which
neither the alleged issuer nor the advising bank informed the bene-
ficiary. A later communication from the alleged issuer to the bene-
ficiary, indicating that no credit will be forthcoming, is accordingly
without legal significance." A by-product of the offer theory of credits
appears in Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co." Insistence by the benefi-
ciary on a different term was said to be a "rejection" which destroyed
the original credit and made valid what was otherwise a wrongful
modification by the issuer. Whether the consent of both customer and
beneficiary must be obtained to a modification or revocation of a credit
is a question on which there appears to be no authority.
Holders of drafts drawn under an irrevocable credit have direct,
rather than derivative, rights against the issuer, if the credit is a
virtual acceptance 3 or a statement of an express or implied promise
to the holder which will be enforced as such.", Although no case
squarely in point has been found, it would appear that a holder if for
value, takes free of any change not known to him, which has been
agreed upon by issuer and beneficiary.
Washington law: There appears to be no decision on these details.
Washington practice: See the discussion under subsection (1) above.
Washington banks expect a holder of a draft, drawn under an irrevo-
cable credit, to have a direct right against the issuer which is immune
v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 216 N.Y.S. 225 (1926), rood. as to damages, 244 N.Y.
516, 155 N.E. 878 (1926) ; National City Bank v. Seattle Nat'l Bank. 121 Wash. 476,
209 Pac. 705 (1922).50 Distribuidora Del Pacifico v. Gonsalez, 88 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Colif. 1950),
(customer's request) ; Williams Ice Cream Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 210 App. Div. 179,
205 N.Y.S. 446 (1924), (beneficiary's request). See also the discussion of § 5-116
below (to be published Winter, 1963).51 Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 97 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
52246 Mass. 139, 140 N.E. 803 (1923).
53 The UNIopR NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 135 makes an unconditional
written promise to accept operate as an acceptance in favor of one who takes the bill
for value. Although the irrevocable credit is rarely unconditional it can be. See the
discussion, McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 HAv. L. REv. 715, 721 (1922).
5 4 FINKELSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 99; Annot. Rights and remedies of holder
of draft issued under letter of credit which is dishonored, 53 A.L.R. 57, 62 (1928).
As decisions cited in this Annot. at 64 indicate, an issuer's promise can run to the
beneficiary alone, in which case there is no contract formed between the issuer and
a person who negotiates a draft. See also the analysis of the position of a holder,
in Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong King & S.B. Corp., 216 App. Div. 495, 215 N.Y.S. 525
(Sup. Ct. 1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
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from changes in the credit which are unknown to him, provided (1)
that the credit has been exhibited to him, and (2) that the credit con-
tains a promise to pay holders. Correlatively, they expect a holder who
does not meet these conditions to take his chances that the credit then
exists in the form in which it was represented to him by the beneficiary,
and that it will continue to so exist.
Critique: See the discussion under subsection (1) above. See also
the discussion of § 5-105. In declaring the irrevocability of an irrevo-
cable credit and the circumstances under which such a credit can be
modified or revoked, this subsection accomplishes relationships which
conform to the prevailing practice so far as customer, beneficiary and
issuer are concerned. It would be difficult indeed for a court to explain
all of these relationships in terms of existing common-law principles.
The position of a holder of a draft drawn by the beneficiary is not so
readily summarized. No express statement about his position appears
in the subsection. Virtual acceptances are not possible under the
Code," so that analysis is barred. Subsection (4) of this section states
a proposition protecting holders of drafts drawn under a revocable
credit, which suggests that the omission in subsection (2) was designed.
In stating a right of modification or revocation "only with" the indi-
cated consents, the subsection infers that no other consents are neces-
sary."' On the other hand, the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" sup-
ports an argument that a credit which contains, as most irrevocable
credits now do, a promise to honor drafts directed to "bona fide holders
of drafts drawn hereunder" makes a conforming holder a party who
has a right to be paid (unless he consents otherwise) according to the
credit as exhibited to him. Although the subsection is not entirely clear
on this detail, there appears to be no particular reason why the sug-
gested argument should not prevail. If the credit contains no promise
to pay holders, a holder will presumably take no direct rights against
the issuer and must stand on his derivative position as a successor of
the drawer."
(3) Unless otherwise agreed after a revocable credit is established
it may be modified or revoked by the issuer without notice to or
consent from the customer or beneficiary.
55 Section 3-410(1) requires that an acceptance be written on the draft
56 Section 5-103(1) (d) defines a beneficiary as "a person who is entitled . . . to
draw or demand payment." A holder cannot meet this test.
5 See the discussion of § 5-116(3) (to be published Winter, 1963).
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(4) Notwithstanding any modification or revocation of a revocable
credit any person authorized to honor or negotiate under the
terms of the original credit is entitled to reimbursement for or
honor of any draft or demand for payment duly honored or
negotiated before receipt of notice of the modification or revoca-
tion and the issuer in turn is entitled to reimbursement from its
customer.
UCP-Article 4 (article 2, Proposed Revision) of UCP reads:
"Revocable credits are not legally binding undertakings between Banks
and beneficiaries. Such credits may be modified or cancelled at any
moment without notice to the beneficiary. When a credit of this nature
has been transmitted to a branch or to another Bank, its modification
or cancellation can take effect only upon receipt of notice thereof by
such branch or other bank, [prior to payment or negotiation, or the
acceptance of drawings thereunder by such branch or other Bank.]"
(The bracketed phrase does not appear in the Proposed Revision.)
The present law-In general: A credit which is in terms revocable
is also subject to modification since "the greater includes the less."' 8
The theory appertaining to revocable credits, the point at which the
credit becomes a legal obligation which the issuer cannot vary, and the
question whether intent to revoke must be communicated to the benefi-
ciary to be legally operative, are matters on which there are differences
of opinion." There appears to be no definitive case authority on the
issuer's recourse against the customer where the issuer is obliged to
honor a draft despite revocation of the credit.
Washington law: There appears to be no relevant Washington au-
thority.
Washington practice: Washington banks regard UCP article 4 as an
accurate statement of the legal situation. Use of revocable credits in
Washington is limited. If used, the credit will, if documentary, incor-
porate UCP by reference. No practice has developed with regard to
the customer's liability to the issuer where the issuer must honor a draft
despite revocation, although it may be assumed that banks will expect
reimbursement from the customer should the problem arise.
Critique: These subsections conform to the existing practice which
is in turn based on UCP article 4. Here is another of the several points
58 United States Steel Products Co. v. Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co., 9 F2d
230, 232 (2d Cir. 1925).
59 See FINKELSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 150; WARD AND HARIu'sD, BANic
CREDITS AND AccEFTAwcEs 14, 15 (1958) ; McCurdy, Commerdal Letters of Credit, 35
H v. L. REv. 539, 568 (1922).
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in the use of credits at which normal contract principles are il-suited
to accomplishment of the precise relationships contemplated by the
parties. Offer principles demand communication of revocation. Pro-
tection of a negotiating party cannot be readily harmonized with the
idea that the beneficiary has no legal rights under the credit. The ex-
pectations of banks about the operation of revocable credits may not
be borne out in future decisions.60
On the other hand, the revocable credit as envisaged by those in the
business of using and issuing credits is but a set of ground rules govern-
ing a transaction in which the issuer undertakes no legal duty at all to
the beneficiary. The commercial utility of such an arrangement in
ordinary sales transactions is small indeed.
Under the subsection the issuer need obtain no one's consent to revo-
cation save where it is "€otherwise agreed after a revocable credit is
issued." The kinds of agreement which are contemplated by the
proviso is not clear. Presumably what is at the outset a revocable credit
can be made irrevocable by a later appropriate expression of purpose
by the issuer, but to whom this purpose shall be expressed and other
relevant details are obscure.
The subsection is understandably silent concerning the right of the
customer to require the issuer to exercise its right to revoke. This is a
detail properly left to the area of customer-issuer legal relations, and
regulated strictly by the contract between them. Put in another way,
whether refusal of the issuer to revoke creates liability to the customer
is to be ascertained from its agreement with the customer and not from
the credit or § 5-106. That the only one having the power to revoke a
credit is the issuer seems clear enough under the subsection.
Whether the section goes too far in making unnecessary any notice
to the beneficiary of revocation can be debated. In support of the
section is the fact that a requirement of notice would introduce an
element of uncertainty, particularly acute in international transactions,
60 It has been suggested that the risks put on the beneficiary by UCP articles 3 and
4 are so unfair that courts probably will not enforce these articles even though they
be incorporated (purportedly) in the credit. Mentschikoff, Letters of Credit: The
Need for Uniform Legislation, 23 U. CHL L. REv. 571 (1956). This observation is
also in effect a criticism of § 5-106(3). The criticism seems unjustified. A bene-
ficiary who acts on a credit which he knows or should know to be revocable has only
himself to blame if the consequences are not to his liking. The subsection is concerned
only with a revocable credit. It is left to the common law to determine whether a
credit is revocable. Presumably courts can be relied on to develop principles which will
adequately protect beneficiaries, including perhaps a principle which denies complete




which would make a revocable credit impracticable from the issuer's
point of view.
Revocable credits are not, in practice, confirmed. They are on occa-
sion advised. An advising bank would normally be authorized to nego-
tiate drafts and would be a probable negotiator. If revocable credits
ever again achieve any general commercial use it would appear de-
sirable to so handle them that notice of revocation will go in routine to
an advising bank and to the beneficiary's bank-of-deposit if known.
Travelers credits may be so worded as to restrict the beneficiary nego-
tiation of drafts at designated banks. The issuer should advise these
banks at once if the credit is revoked or modified.
Having honored a draft presented by a holder who must be paid pur-
suant to § 5-106(3) even though the beneficiary then has no legal right
against the issuer, has the issuer any recourse against the beneficiary?
There are two possible situations. The beneficiary may have negoti-
ated the draft with knowledge of the revocation, or without such knowl-
edge. It is difficult to see any theory on which the issuer can proceed in
either situation, if the documents are genuine and the goods (where a
sale is involved) conform to the underlying contract. As a drawee the
issuer has no right against the drawer on the instrument. Whether
courts may be persuaded that there is a duty of some other kind run-
ning from beneficiary to issuer is conjectural. Insolvency of a customer
might very well raise the problem.
Section 5-107. Advice of credit; confirmation; error in statement
of terms.
(1) Unless otherwise specified an advising bank by advising a credit
issued by another bank does not assume any obligation to honor
drafts drawn or demands for payment made under the credit
but it does assume obligation for the accuracy of its own state-
ment.
UCP-Article 6 of UCP reads: "Irrevocable credits may be advised
to the beneficiary through an advising Bank without responsibility on
the latter's part." (Article 3 of the Proposed Revision is to the same
effect.)
The present law: In general: There appears to be no definitive case
authority concerning the existence of a contract duty running from
advising bank to beneficiary. There appears to be no definitive case
authority concerning the tort liability of an advising bank which negli-
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gently misstates the terms of credit. The problem was discussed in
a New York case, and the court suggested as dictum that liability in
the advising bank is doubtful.' Whether the advising bank is liable to
the customer for misstating the credit to the beneficiary is not deter-
minable. In a comparable situation the customer has been denied re-
covery."
Whether a reference to UCP in a letter of advice will successfully
incorporate article 6 of UCP is not clear." Whether inclusion in such
a letter of an express disclaimer of liability for negligence will be legally
operative is not entirely free from doubt. The preponderance of mod-
ern authority supports the legality of the disclaimer.6
Washington law: There appears to be no definitive case authority on
any phase of this subsection. There are conflicting Washington deci-
sions concerning the legality of a disclaimer of liability for negligence,"
and (apparently) no cases on the other details.
Washington practice: Although Washington banks feel that article 6
of UCP is an accurate statement of their legal position on the credit,
as to both revocable and irrevocable credits, they include express dis-
claimer clauses in the forms used for the advising of credits (e.g. "This
advice conveys no engagement on our part"). It is not clear whether
this is an expression of doubt about the effectiveness of an incorporation
of UCP by reference in the letter of advice, or is an acknowledgment
of the ambiguity of the word "responsibility" as used in article 6.
Washington banks expect to be responsible if, through their negligence,
a credit-is incorrectly advised.
Advising is done by Washington banks and their domestic corre-
spondents without charge and as an inter-bank service. For advising a
61 Scanlon v. First Nat'l Bank, 249 N.Y. 9, 162 N.E. 567 (1928).6 2 Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377,
157 N.E. 272 (1927).63 The distaste of courts for broad-gauged exculpatory clauses suggests that an
attempt to incorporate such a clause by reference may not work, unless the beneficiary
can be shown to have actual knowledge of the provisions of UCP. See the discussion
in Mlentschikoff, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1956).64 RESTATE.ENT, CONTRAcTS § 574 (1932); 6 CoamnN, CONTRACTS § 1472 (1950);
6 WTLLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1751B, 1751C (rev. ed. 1936); Annot. Validity of
contractual provision by one other thZn carrier or employer for exemption from lia-
bility, or indemnification, for consequences of own negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948).
6 Cf. Broderson v. Rainier Nat'l Park Co., 187 Wash. 399, 60 P.2d 234 (1936),
and Ramsden v. Grimshaw, 23 Wn.2d 864, 162 P2d 901 (1945). See the discussion,
Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957: Part II, 34 WAsHr. L. Ray. 467
(1959). Since the Broderson case seems the better reasoned, the odds appear to
favor the court following it in the future. The disclaimer is of simple negligence,
not of wilful misdoing. Use of express disclaimer clauses in letters advising of
credits would appear desirable and likely to prove successful.
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modification in a credit a small charge is made. The fact that a bank
is asked to advise a credit is taken as demonstrating an implied request
to negotiate drafts drawn under the credit.
Critique: The subsection conforms to the existing practice insofar
as it disclaims any duty by an advising bank to honor drafts. The
absence of any statement about a duty to negotiate drafts is proper.
Protection in this subsection is not needed, since a credit has no under-
taking by anyone which can reasonably be argued to be a promise to
negotiate drafts. An advising bank can enter into an agreement with
the beneficiary to negotiate, but evidence of such agreement is hardly
to be found in a letter of advice.
Neither here nor elsewhere does article 5 attempt to determine the
legal relations between a negotiating bank and the customer. The
omission seems entirely justified. Whether there are or should be any
legal relations between these parties is an inquiry quite foreign to the
relationships created by the credit or directly germane to it.6"
The subsection clearly enough limits the scope of the obligation to
mistakes of the advising bank. Mistakes of the issuer, or of the tele-
graph company either in transmitting the issuer's message to the
advising bank or in transmitting the advice, are not included.67
The subsection does not specify to whom the duty to advise accu-
rately shall run. The beneficiary is an obvious obligee but the cus-
tomer's position is obscure.
What is intended by the phrase "unless otherwise specified" is un-
clear. If a correspondent bank undertakes to honor drafts it will not
be an advising bank. Perhaps this phrase is declaratory of legal effect
for a clause, disclaiming liability for negligence, used in an advising
letter.
(2) A confirming bank by confirming a credit becomes directly obli-
63 The very limited case coverage of controversies between them suggests that there
is no legal duty running from the negotiating bank to the customer. Oelbermann v.
National City Bank of New York, 79 F2d 534 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Courteen Seed Co. v.
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927) ; Samuel
Kronman & Co. v. Public Nat'l Bank, 218 App. Div. 624, 218 N.Y.S. 616 (App. Div.
1926).
67 Neither here nor elsewhere does article 5 attempt to cover a very knotty prob-
lem, i.e., can the recipient of a telegram hold the sender to the message as received,
where the message as received differs from the message handed to the telegraph com-
pany by the sender? General use of cablegrams in the handling of credits makes the
question of some importance in such transactions. It arose indirectly in a letter of
credit context, in Murray Oil Products Co. v. Poons Co., 190 Misc. 110, 74 N.Y.S.2d
814 (New York City Ct. 1947), and the court allied itself with the jurisdictions which
regard the telegraph company as an independent contractor. The problem is discussed
in 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 105 (1950) ; 1 WILLrSTON, CoNTRAcTs § 94 (3rd ed. 1957).
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gated on the credit to the extent of its confirmation as though it
were its issuer and acquires the rights of an issuer.
UCP-Article 5 of UCP reads in part:
"When the issuing Bank instructs another Bank to confirm its irrevo-
cable credit and when the latter does so, the confirmation implies a
definite undertaking of the confirming Bank as from the date on which
it gives confirmation. In case of credits available by negotiation of
drafts, the confirmation implies only the undertaking of the confirming
Bank to negotiate drafts without recourse to drawer."
Article 3 of the Proposed Revision is to the same effect, plus a require-
ment that confirmation be in writing.
The present law-In general and in Washington: There appears to
be no definitive case authority concerning the obligations of a confirm-
ing bank. The dearth of decisions evidently reflects a general assump-
tion that a confirming bank is legally liable on its undertaking." Just
what rights a confirming bank has under the present law is not clear. 9
Washington practice: Washington banks assume that confirmation
creates a legal duty to the beneficiary co-extensive with that of the
issuer. The requests for confirmation received by Washington banks
typically incorporate instructions about reimbursement, i.e., to charge
the requester's account or to draw on the requester. If a request comes
in which does not conform to this practice, confirmation may be re-
fused. If confirmation is made, an implied duty to reimburse is assumed
to exist.
Critique: The subsection commits a confirming bank to the under-
taking recited in the credit, save as limitations are stated in the con-
firmation. This conforms to the present practice and provides a useful
positive statement of law. The subsection does not purport to cover all
of the possible legal relations attending the confirmation process and
Gs E. g., FiNIcxr.smIN, op. cit supra note 17, at 154 (flat statement that beneficiary
has rights against a confirming bank similar to those he has against the issuer; no
cases cited) ; Dulien Steel Products, Inc. of Wash. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d
836 (2d Cir. 1962), (action by customer against confirming bank; that the bank was
liable to the beneficiary when conditions were met was stated by the court as a base
oint); North Woods Paper Mills v. National City Bank, 121 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Sup.
Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 731, 127 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1954) ("It is a general rule
that a bank which confirms or issues an irrevocable letter of credit thereby assumes an
obligation to honor all drafts ...."), 121 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
6 See the discussion of § 5-114(3). (To be published in the winter, 1963 issue)
Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1925),
cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925), demonstrates that it may be difficult to determine
whether a bank requesting another to participate in a letter of credit transaction is an
issuer requesting confirmation or a correspondent bank requesting issue of a credit. Until
this detail is resolved a discussion of "rights" is bootless.
1962]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the omissions seem sound. Section 5-109 is the more appropriate con-
text in which to consider the confirming bank's duty (if any) to the
customer and § 5-114(3) is the better place to consider its right to re-
imbursement and security. Less understandable is the absence of a
statement to the effect that a confirmation is also an advice of the basic
credit. There seems no reasonable doubt, however, that the phrase
"authorized written advice of its issuance" as used in § 5-106(1) (a)
will encompass the combination of a request to the correspondent bank
for confirmation and communication of the confirmation by such bank
to the beneficiary. The confirmation forms used by Washington banks
clearly state the terms of the basic credit and identify the issuer of it.
The beneficiary has two obligors7" and is not restricted by this sub-
section or any other provision of article 5 in his recourse against either
or both of them. It must be expected of course that he can get satisfac-
tion but one. The confirming bank will ordinarily be the closer and
hence the easier to sue.
(3) Even though an advising bank incorrectly advises the terms of a
credit it has been authorized to advise the credit is established
as against the issuer to the extent of its original terms.
UCP-The UCP has no comparable provision.
The present law-In general and in Washington: There appears to
be no relevant case authority.
Washington practice: Washington banks assume that the terms of
their obligation will not vary from those stated to the advising bank,
which is in part a reflection of their assumption that they are not re-
sponsible to anyone for mistakes of the advising bank.7 There appears
to have been no occasion to consider whether a beneficiary who met the
terms of the credit as communicated to the advising bank has a right to
performance even though the credit as advised to him had other terms.
In the nature of things such a beneficiary will be rare indeed.
70 The Official Comment to § 5-107 reads in part: "The most important aspect of
this rule is that a beneficiary who has received a confirmed credit has the independent
engagements of both the issuer and the confirming bank. A confirming bank may of
course be an advising bank so far as the issuer's engagement is concerned but this is
rarely of importance because its own engagement if the terms be improperly advised will
be to honor in accordance with those terms."
71 UCP article 14 reads in part: "Banks utilising the services of another Bank
assume no liability or responsibility (unless they themselves are at fault) should the
instructions they transmit not be carried out exactly, even if they have themselves
taken the initiative in the choice of their correspondent." Article 12 of the Proposed
Revision is to the same effect. Comparable clauses appear in the application forms
used by Washington banks.
[VoL. 37
LETTERS OF CREDIT AND THE U.C.C.
Critique: The negative inference of the subsection, that an issuer is
not bound to the terms of an incorrectly advised credit, coincides with
the existing practice. Liability on the original credit is apparently a
matter on which there is as yet neither case authority nor practice.
Basic agency principles might support a denial of the issuer's liability
for the credit as advised, but cannot support liability on a credit stated
to the advising bank by the issuer and not advised. Incorrect advice
means the correct credit is not advised. If the credit is a contract which
exists without regard to communication between issuer and beneficiary,
there would be liability on it although the advising bank advised a
different credit. Section 5-106(1) (b) states however that a credit is
established as to the beneficiary when he receives authorized written
advice of its issuance. Arguably this means correct advice. Were it not
for § 5-107(3) it might be difficult to work out a plausible theory on
which to hold the issuer to the terms of the credit it intended to issue,
and the subsection therefor removes another source of possible conflict.
Why an issuer should choose to or be entitled to resist the beneficiary's
attempt to enforce this credit is unclear. The subsection seems entirely
sound.
(4) Unless otherwise specified the customer bears as against the
issuer all risks of transmission and reasonable translation or in-
terpretation of any message relating to a credit.
UCP-Article 12 (article 10, Proposed Revision) of UCP reads:
"Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the consequences
arising out of delay and/or loss in transit of any messages, letters
and/or documents, or for delay, mutilation or other errors in the trans-
mission of cables, telegrams, or other mechanically transmitted mes-
sages, or for errors in translation or interpretation of technical terms,
and Banks reserve the right to transmit credit terms without trans-
lating them."
The present law-In general and in Washington: There appears to
be no relevant case authority.
Washington practice: The following is quoted from the application
form which a Washington bank receives from it customers, and is typi-
cal: "Neither you nor your correspondents shall be responsible.., for
errors, omissions, interruptions or delays in transmission or delivery
of any messages, by mail, cable, telegraph, wireless or otherwise,
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whether or not they be in cipher... " As to errors in translation made
by a correspondent bank the issuer will be protected by a general appli-
cation-form waiver covering all acts of correspondents. As to errors in
translation made by the issuer the application forms used by Washing-
ton banks contain no direct waiver. The forms do contain broadly
stated clauses purporting to approve all good-faith acts of the issuer
taken in connection with the credit, which might include acts taken
pursuant to a mistaken translation."2 UCP is not incorporated in appli-
cations for credits, nor in travelers credits. It is routinely made a part
of documentary credits by incorporation. Washington banks in advis-
ing or confirming a credit received via cable indicate to the customer
that it has been so received and is subject to correction on receipt of the
pertinent mail communication.
Critique: The subsection conforms to the existing practice so far as
responsibility for the transmission of messages is concerned and pro-
vides a desirable legal basis for the practice. In relieving the issuer
from liability for reasonable but erroneous (and possibly negligent)
translation or interpretation the subsection states a more limited waiver
than does UCP, which purports to relieve the issuer without regard to
the reasonableness of his conduct or its negligent character. On the
other hand, there is real doubt whether a disclaimer of liability for neg-
ligence is lawful in Washington. The subsection clarifies the law on this
detail, and should produce sound results.
Subsection (4) is directed at customers. Errors in the transmission
of a credit can induce disputes between issuer and beneficiary. For
such disputes article 5 provides no solution.73
Section 5-108. "Notation Credit"; Exhaustion of Credit
(1) A credit which specifies that any person purchasing or paying
drafts drawn or demands for payment made under it must note
the amount of the draft or demand on the letter or advice of
credit is a "notation of credit."
7 2 Whether an application-form clause by which the customer waives its claim for
injury suffered by reason of the issuer's negligence would be lawful in Washington is
not clear. The problem is discussed in another context in note 65 supra.
73 This is a detail on which there are cases in other areas, divided in result. The
schism is produced by divergent views about the relationships between telegraph carri-
ers and the persons who use their services. See the discussion at note 67 supra. This is
an area of conflict which is collateral to the function of article 5 and is wisely omitted
from it. Whether incorporation of UCP in a credit, by reference, will produce a result
different from that which the court would otherwise reach is unclear.
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(2) Under a notation credit
(a) a person paying the beneficiary or purchasing a draft or
demand for payment from him acquires a right to honor only
if the appropriate notation is made and by transferring or
forwarding for honor the documents under the credit such a
person warrants to the issuer that the notation has been
made; and
(b) unless the credit or a signed statement that an appropriate
notation has been made accompanies the draft or demand
for payment the issuer may delay honor until evidence of
notation has been procured which is satisfactory to it but its
obligation and that of its customer continue for a reasonble
time not exceeding thirty days to obtain such evidence.
UCP-The UCP has no coverage of these details.
The present law-In general and in Washington: There appear to be
no relevant decisions.
Washington practice: Travelers credits issued by Washington banks
typically call for notation. Commercial credits typically do not. Some
notation credits recite a warranty by a negotiating bank, that the nota-
tion has been made, and others simply say that the negotiating bank
must make the notation. Issuers expect to have a legal excuse for not
honoring a draft which has not been noted, and a right over against a
negotiating bank which fails to note. Drafts presented under notation
credits are honored without requiring proof of notation, save where the
issuer has reason to believe the draft in question has not been noted.
There is no practice with regard to modes of proof or grace periods. It
is the practice of Washington banks when negotiating drafts under a
non-notation credit to note the draft on the credit as a safeguard to
itself and other negotiating banks.
The application forms taken from customers typically exonerate the
issuer from responsibility for the failure of any person to make proper
notation on the credit.
Critique: Here again article 5 supplies a statutory statement of basic
legal relations which are expected but which are in fact now uncertain.
The forms currently in use in Washington for notation credits appear
to adequately specify that notation must be made. Under subsection
(2) such a specification produces both a condition to the issuer's duty
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and a warranty to the issuer by a person who negotiates, which is the
desired result but one difficult to reach by the application of normal
contract analysis.7 4
Because notation is a condition operative even though the draft is
presented by a remote transferee, the issuer is entitled to proof. The
details are regulated by subsection(2) (b) in a sensible way. The stated
grace period will extend an expiry date set in the credit. It may be
surmised that in practical operations the indicated "signed statement"
will become a routine adjunct to the documents submitted to the issuer,
the grace period serving only as a safety valve for the occasional aber-
rant transaction. The provision for a "reasonable" grace period, not
exceeding thirty days, has an obvious potential for uncertainty in oper-
ation. The drawbacks in this type of standard seem offset here by the
need for flexibility in meeting the various problems which can arise.
There will no doubt be instances in which the issuer prefers to waive
the condition and pay even though the draft was not noted. The sub-
section does not preclude such a waiver. The application form can be
so framed (and those in current use seem adequate) as to continue the
customer's duty to reimburse, either where there is a waiver or where
the issuer is led by a non-notation, of which it is unaware, to exceed the
stated amount-limit of the credit.
What are the legal relations between the issuer and a person who
negotiates a draft which, with earlier drafts, makes the total of the
draws against the credit exceed the authorized total? Although sub-
section (2) does not expressly so indicate, an issuer which pays a draft
it was not under a legal duty to pay cannot very well assert this fact as
an excuse for not paying a draft which would not be an over-draw had
the non-complying draft not been paid. 5 Under this analysis, an issuer
which chooses to waive notation as to a particular draft will not be able
74 The typical credit avoids the direct language: "We will pay only on condition
that each draft be noted on the credit," and thus presents the ambiguity implicit in a
promisor's statement that something "shall be done" by the other party. Whether this
kind of statement demands a counter-promise or expresses a condition qualifying the
promisor's undertaking is a common problem. On litigation a condition will probably
be found, but the issue is an interpretation one which may in an individual transaction
go either way. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 260, 261 (1932). Cf. Campbell, Guaran-
ties and the Suretyship Phases of Letters of Credit, 85 U. PA. L. Rxv. 174, 197 (1936).
That a statement like this can both exact a counter-promise, impliedly made by
negotiating a draft drawn by the beneficiary, and also condition the issuer's undertaking,
is a novel concept.75 An analogous problem was litigated in Bank of Seneca v. First Nat'l Bank, 105
Mo. App. 722, 78 S.W. 1092 (1904) (bank held unable to reduce credit by the amount
of checks drawn by the beneficiary and negotiated to a holder which took and presented
them without knowledge of the credit).
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to charge that draft to the credit as against a person later presenting a
conforming draft. On similar reasoning an issuer which pays a noncon-
forming draft cannot charge it to the credit even though the issuer does
not know that the notation condition has not been met. The "signed
statement" mentioned in subsection (2) (b) does not satisfy the nota-
tion condition. Subsection (2) (a) clearly makes "the appropriate no-
tation" the condition and the arguable inference in subsection (2) (b)
that the issuer must pay on presentation of a "signed statement" seems
unsupportable. Whether this means issuers will always demand other
proof remains to be seen. They probably will not, simply because
delays in honoring drafts would destroy the utility of credits, whereas
the signed statement will usually provide assurance enough that the
notation was made, the statement having been made by a bank.
In imposing both a duty to note and a warranty of notation on a
"person paying the beneficiary or purchasing a draft from him" sub-
section (2) achieves results which are currently in particular doubt."6
The warranty runs to the issuer, leaving for the law of negotiable in-
struments a controversy between transferor and transferee of a draft.
In the final analysis these subsections create a system which should
enable the beneficiary to negotiate his drafts with a minimum of diffi-
culty. The penalty for non-notation is sure enough to make the absence
of notation on the credit satisfactory evidence that un-noted drafts
have not been issued. Meanwhile issuers are amply protected. The in-
cidence of un-noted drafts should be very small. The issuer's recourse
will ordinarily be against a bank, and often against a correspondent
bank. The system provides a sound and workable basis from a banking
point of view, for credits which permit of multiple draws.
The customer appears to be the forgotten man in subsection (2) (b).
There is much difference between a travelers credit and a documentary
credit at this point. Under the latter the customer may be materially
prejudiced by delay for even a reasonable time. In these days of tele-
graphic communication and wide-spread networks of correspondent
banks, any appreciable delay at this stage of a documentary credit
seems unjustifiable. Whether this is a detail which can be fixed by
appropriate language in the credit is not clear. On principle it would
seem that it can, and that credits can effectively restrict the time
within which proof of notation can be furnished. The point is to a
76 See Mentschikoff, Letters of Credit: The Need for Uniform Legislation, 23 U.
CHI. L. REv. 571, 599 (1956).
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considerable degree moot. Commercial documentary credits issued by
Washington banks are now typically non-notation and there is no
reason to expect a change in this practice.
(3) If the credit is not a notation credit
(a) the issuer may honor complying drafts or demands for pay-
ment presented to it in the order in which they are presented
and is discharged pro tanto by honor of any such draft or
demand;
(b) as between competing good faith purchasers of complying
drafts or demands the person first purchasing has priority
over a subsequent purchaser even though the later pur-
chased draft or demand has been first honored.
UCP-The UCP has no coverage of these details.
The present law-In general and in Washington: There appear to be
no relevant decisions.
Washington practice: Washington banks issue many non-notation
credits, (in fact, almost all commercial documentary credits issued here
are non-notation) and expect to be discharged pro tanto by each draft
honored under such a credit. Although little occasion has arisen to
consider the problem, it is probably expected that the priorities of per-
sons who negotiate drafts from the beneficiary are regulated by the
time order of the negotiations.
Critique: The subsection states legal relations which conform to the
present practice. It also conforms to § 3-801 (Drafts in a Set), which
in turn conforms to Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § § 178,
179, and 183.Y1 Implicit in the recited priorities is a legal right in a
holder whose draft was first negotiated to recover from a person who
subsequently negotiated a draft which exhausted the credit and on
which honor was obtained.
[This discussion will be continued in the Winter, 1963 issue.]
7 RCW 62.01.178, 62.01.179, 62.01.183.
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